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Gleave respectfully moves for a rehearing on the
issue of punitive damages.

In support of this motion,

Gleave relies on the following:
POINT I
THIS COURTfS LEGAL FRAMEWORK IS CORRECT
Gleave agrees with this Court's legal analysis.
Specifically, this Court has ruled that:
Before punitive damages may be awarded,
the plaintiff must prove conduct that is
willful and malicious or that manifests
a knowing and reckless indifference
toward, and disregard of, the rights of
others . . • (Slip Opinion at p. 17.)
POINT II
RECONSIDERATION IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE COURT REVIEWED
THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE
TO RIO GRANDE (INSTEAD OF GLEAVE)
This Court correctly noted that the evidence
should be reviewed in the light most favorable to
Gleave:
In reviewing the correctness of the
trial court's grant of a directed
verdict to Rio Grande on Gleave's
punitive damage claim, we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to
him [Gleave], the party against whom the
motion was made. (Slip Opinion, at p.
17.)

However, it is respectfully
Court

did

Rather,

not

the

follow

Court

Gleave's

followed

Rio

submitted

version

of

Grande's

that the

the evidence.
version

of

the

evidence.

A.

NEAR MISSES
The Court noted that plaintiff offered no evidence

of

"near misses."

However, that statement was not true-

There was significant evidence of "near misses".
(R. 1683-1686.)1
In fact, there were eight prior
(One car had two separate near misses.)

"near misses".

One of the "near

misses" involved a mother and her children.

Instead of a

crushed leg, this case might easily have been about the
death of a young family.
Presumably, the train engineer was looking out his
window and tooting his horn.

Or in other words, Rio Grande

had knowledge of each "near miss", because they saw it.

x

The court refused to let the testimony go to the jury.
However, plaintiff preserved the offer of proof. Today's
opinion shows clearly that the evidence was relevant and the
testimony should have been received.
See Robinson v.
Seaboard System R-R. Inc., 361 S.E. 2d 909 (N.C. App. 1987).
2

B.

PRIOR INJURIES
The opinion stresses that there were no accidents

at the crossing up to the time of UDOT's inspection and
evaluation in 1974.2

(Slip opinion at p. 19.)

However,

there were two accidents after that inspection, but prior to
the

Gleave

accident.

serious injuries.
grazed.

C.

One

of

those

accidents

involved

In the second accident, the car was only

(R. 1685 . )

TEMPORARY STOP SIGN
This Court stressed that Rio Grande had installed

a stop sign to improve safety until flashing lights could be
installed.

(Slip Opinion at p. 19 0

The

Court supposed

this was evidence of good faith.
However, there was evidence that the stop sign did
little or nothing to improve safety.

Before the stop sign

was installed, the Utah County Surveyor wrote:

2

The Reply Brief of Rio Grande at p. 22 argued that
"The uncontroverted evidence in this case is that there were
no prior accidents at this crossing as of 1974 when the UDOT
survey team recommended installation of a stop sign." That
statement is true but misleading. The crucial time at issue
is not before 1974 but after 1974. Thus, Rio Grande lead
the Court into error.

3

It is also their feeling [County Road
Commission] that very few people will
pay attention to them [stop signs].
However, it would place responsibility
on the driver if he violated the stop
sign and was involved in an accident.
(See plaintiff's Exhibit 12.)
Compare Gleave's opening brief —

red cover -- at

From this

infer that Rio

p. 29.
letter, a

jury could

Grande's purpose in placing the stop sign had nothing to do
with public safety.

Rather, Rio Grande's purpose was simply

to get some legal protection from lawsuits.
It was easy and cheap for Rio Grande to place a
stop

sign.

remained

However, Rio

very

1238-1241.)

dangerous

Grande
even

knew

with

that

the

stop

the

crossing

sign.

(R.

Yet for over eight years, Rio Grande left that

cheap and ineffective stop sign in place with no further
safety measures.

Indeed, there is evidence from which a

jury could infer that the stop sign made the crossing more
dangerous. (R. 1588-1589, 1606.) A jury might infer that
to place a stop sign —

and nothing more —

was evidence of

a cynical "public be damned" attitude on the part of the
railroad.

4

D.

RURAL LOCALITY
This Court's opinion stressed " . . . The locality

was rural, and the road was not heavily travelled. "3

in

fact, the crossing is in a moderately built-up area of town
and

serves

Exhibit 8.
p. 28.)

a

residential

subdivision.

(See

plaintiff's

Compare Gleave's opening brief - red cover - at

The jury could infer from the evidence that the

road bears a medium amount of traffic —
and children.

especially women

Certainly it is incorrect to regard this as a

"rural" crossing.

E.

KNOWLEDGE OF DANGER
This Court stressed that, "There is no evidence

that Rio Grande knew or

should have known of the

discovered by Gleavefs expert
19.)

facts

. . ." (Slip Opinion at p.

Gleave concedes that punitive damages should not lie

if Rio Grande had no knowledge of the danger.
However,
maintained it.

Rio

Grande

built

the

railroad

and

A jury could easily infer that the builder

of the railroad had actual knowledge of the danger.

If not,

the railroad was reckless for building a railroad without
any thought or analysis of the public danger.

3

The Court was apparently led into this
statements in the Brief of Appellant at p. 4.
5

error

by

Moreover, Gleave
Court

has

overlooked

the

respectfully
testimony

submits
of

that

Joseph

the

Yuhas.

(Compare Gleave's opening brief - red cover - at p. 2 8.)
Yuhas worked for the State of Utah.

In 1975 (eight years

before the accident), Yuhas met with a representative of Rio
Grande at the crossing to make an official joint inspection.
The purpose of the inspection was to inspect the safety of
the crossing, including warning signs and sight distance.
(R. 1238.)
The specific findings of that inspection were:
The sight distance, alignment of track
and highway approach gradient, condition
of the road surface and condition of the
crossing are poor. (R. 1241.)
Thus,
specific

danger

engineer

in

Rio

Grande

at

charge

that
of

all

knew

as

crossing.
trackage

early

as

Also,

Rio

travelled

1974

the

Grande's
over

that

specific curve between once each week and once each month
for over ten years. (R. 1329.)
brief —

red cover —

(Compare Gleave's opening

at p. 28.)

Finally, this specific

crossing was inspected by Rio Grande on a regular basis.
(R. 1326.)

6

A

jury could easily

infer that

Rio Grande had

actual knowledge of the danger.

F.

HIGHLY UNREASONABLE CONDUCT
This Court's opinion stressed that there was no

extreme

departure

from

ordinary

care-

"At

worst,

the

evidence shows errors of judgment . . . in failing to take
steps to reduce the risks at this crossing-"
at p- 19.)

(Slip Opinion

It is respectfully submitted that the jury

might see it otherwise.
One of plaintiff's experts testified that this was
the worst out of thousands of crossings he had inspected.
(Slip opinion at p. 8-)

Without more, a jury might find

that to be "highly unreasonable conduct."

Furthermore, it

would have been easy and cheap to improve safety.

All Rio

Grande had to do was light a match and burn the weeds which
obstructed vision.4
Next,

this

(R. 1597.)
was

not

a

case

where

Rio

Grande

overlooked some safety procedures at a single intersection.
Rather, this is a case where Rio Grande completely ignores

^Plaintiff's expert also testified about additional
types of improvements which could have been made.
(R.
1599-1600)
7

automobile safety at every crossing in Utah as a matter of
policy.

Rio Grande has no rules or regulations with respect

to safety procedures for such blind crossings.

(R. 1333.)

For example, Rio Grande does not even consider such blind
crossings in setting train speeds.

(R. 1334.)

Indeed, Rio

Grande has no rules or regulations or standards at all with
respect to automobile safety.

(R. 1338.)

A jury might do more than find this to be "highly
unreasonable conduct."

A jury might be outraged.5

After

all, when a car and a train collide, the car never wins.

G.

PUBLIC OBJECTIVES
This Court stated that, "Gleave has not directed

our attention to any public objective which would clearly be

5

The failure to have any policy at all for automobile
safety is in direct conflict with the laws of this state.
This Court has stated:
"The statute relied upon by Rio
Grande does not relieve it of the duty to operate trains
with reasonable care, nor does it prohibit Rio Grande from
exercising reasonable care in the operation of its trains
and the maintenance of its right-of-way. Rio Grande cannot
ignore the public peril at a more than ordinarily hazardous
crossing and excuse itself until UDOT takes action to
upgrade the safety devices at the 1600 South crossing. Rio
Grande remains subject to a standard of care which, under
the circumstances of the crossing, could require actions to
reduce risks imposed on the public." Slip Opinion at p. 6.
8

accomplished by an award of punitive damages herein."

(Slip

Opinion at p. 20.)
It

is

respectfully

public objective.

submitted

that

there

is

a

The public objective is to protect the

public at all of the other railroad crossings in Utah.
Gleave's opening brief —

red cover —

(See

at p. 32.)

There is evidence in this case that Rio Grande had
actual knowledge of the danger.

(See paragraph E above.)

There is further evidence that Rio Grande has no rules or
regulations or standards at all with respect to automobile
safety.

(See paragraph F above.)

Thus, similar dangers may

be lurking at hundreds of other railroad crossings in Utah.
By permitting punitive damages now, lives may be
saved tomorrow!

Someone must teach Rio Grande that public

safety comes before profits!

H.

SACRIFICING PUBLIC SAFETY TO SAVE MONEY
The federal government has a program to pay for

safety improvements at selected railroad crossings.

Each

year several crossings are improved or upgraded by these
federal funds.

The federal funds are applied first to the

most dangerous crossings

according

(R. 1635 and R. 1336. )
9

to the state's study.

In one sense, this federal program has backfired.
The railroad realizes that if they wait long enough, someone
else (viz. the federal government) will pay to improve the
safety at the railroad crossings.

Therefore, the railroads

have a powerful economic motive to do nothing -- or at least
to do as little as possible.

In this case, Rio Grande has

candidly admitted that:
. . . Rio Grande's desire to have a stop
sign at the subject crossing made sense
as a temporary measure.
(i.e. until
UDOT obtained federal funds to install
active signals.)
Reply Brief of Rio
Grande at p. 22.
Thus, in the face of a very dangerous crossing,
Rio Grande took the cheapest and most ineffective possible
safety measure —
wouldn't

even

a stop sign was installed.
pay

to

burn

the

weeds.

Rio Grande
(R.

1597.)

Furthermore, Rio Grande wouldn't even consider slowing the
trains no matter how dangerous the crossing.
Accidents
problem

in Utah.

at

railroad

crossings

(R. 1334.)
are

However, there is a powerful

a

major

economic

incentive for a railroad to do little or nothing in the way
of safety while waiting for federal funding.

10

Such funding

can take a decade or more.

In the meantime, the slaughter

continues.°
Punitive damages would be a powerful motive for
Rio Grande and others to take reasonable steps for safety -even while waiting for federal funding.^
Gleave
jurisdictions

which

crossing cases.^
—

at p. 31.)

has

cited
allow

numerous
punitive

cases

from

damages

in

(See Gleave's opening brief —

foreign
railroad

red cover

Those cases have a common thread which is

applicable here:
The jury was entitled to infer that [the
railroad] had knowledge of the potential
danger . . • and that it was consciously

^This court can take judicial notice of the attached
news reports. Rule 201(b) Utah Rules of Evidence. Judicial
notice can be taken at any stage of the proceedings
including the appellate stage. Rule 201 (f) Utah Rules of
Evidence. According to the Provo Herald article, the Utah
County Sheriff's office (where the Gleave accident took
place), investigates a car/train accident once or twice per
month.
7

This Court wrote:
"We believe the substantial
compensatory award will provide ample motivation for Rio
Grande to take appropriate measures to protect the public
and itself from a recurrence of this unfortunate accident."
(Slip Opinion at p. 20.) It is respectfully suggested that
a jury should make that determination.
If a jury is so
convinced, the jury would likely grant a small award or no
award.
Rio Grande has cited no contrary cases.
11

indifferent to the rights, welfare, and
safety of such persons affected by the
danger.
Poole
v
Missouri
Pacific
Railroad Co., 638 S.W. 2d 10 (Tex 1982).
POINT III
THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIM CAN BE TRIED SEPARATELY
The jury found Rio Grande to be 100% negligent,
and

Gleave

0%

negligent.

punitive damage claim
tried

separately.

liability
brief —

issues

red cover —

court

affirmed.

If

the

is resurrected, that claim can be

There
back

This

for

is no reason
trial.

to also

send

(See Gleave's

the

opening

p. 33.)

CONCLUSION
It
opinion

is

followed

respectfully
Rio

submitted

Grande's

version

that
of

this
the

Court's

evidence.

However, the Court should have followed Gleave's version of
the evidence.

This Court has written in this case:

If,
however,
reasonable
inferences
supporting judgment for the losing party
could
be drawn
from
the
evidence
presented at trial, the directed verdict
cannot be sustained. (Slip Opinion at
p. 17.)

12

If the Court remains true to that standard, the
Petition for Reconsideration must be granted.

• -V7

DATED this
IIS

/

;

day of

: -—

, 1988.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff

By.

//

ROBERT J .

j}EBRY

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
I,

Robert

J.

DeBry,

hereby

certify

that

this
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-.

/

ROBERT J. DEBRY
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Ralph Nightingale survived this collision with an Amtrak train Monday near American Fork.
Doug Land Photo

Officials cite safety program
following train-truck accident
By PATRICK CHRISTIAN T n
Herald Staff Writer ( ~ *7I
A Utah County Sheriff's patrol sergeant says
there are too many accidents between two-ton
automobiles or pickups and trains that may weigh
between 3,000 and 10 000 tons like the one that left a
Spnngville man in critical condition Monday
Ralph H Nightingale, 31, of Spnngville was
critically injured Monday morning when his pickup
truck was struck by a southbound passenger train on
a rural county road near American Fork
His condition was upgraded this morning to
serious but stable
The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
crossing was marked by two stationary signs and the
train was blowing its whistle, said a sheriff's
investigator
'We seem to investigate a car/train accident
once or twice a month, said Patrol Sergeant Doug
Witney, who indicated that's too many
Witney says his past investigations have led him
to conclude that there are three main reasons for
trams ramming automobiles
The first reason is simply that drivers simply
don t have their minds on driving and fail to notice
railroad signs, tracks and even a train with it s
whistle blaring, he says
A second reason he gives is that the driver has
ronsumed too much alcohol and his reasoning and
reaction abilities are deadened
Reason three is that familiarity breeds complacency What happens is a driver is so familiar with
the route because they drive it day after day that
they drive it almost automatically without paying
full attention '
Dick Tincher, director of public relations tor

Union Pacific Railroad, said all railroads in Utah
are working with governmental organizations concerned with safety in a program called Operation
Life Safety "
He said the program was kicked otf in May in
Utah and aims to increase driver awareness of the
dangers of not paying attention to moving trains
"Between 1982 and 1987 there were 23 people
killed and 106 people injured in 259 accidents in Utah
involving trains and other vehicles, said Tincher
He said 36 percent of these kinds ot accidents
actually happen at crossings with flashing lights and
gates because motorists still try to go around the
gates and try to beat a fast moving tram across the
track
He said that 39 percent of these accidents have
occurred at night and in 25 percent ot the accidents
drivers actually ran into the side of a tram that was
already in the process of crossmg the road
Tincher said it's often difficult to judge the speed
of an oncoming tram He said many of them are
legally doing 65 to 70 mph when they cross a
roadway He compared a tram hittmg an automobile
with an automobile running over an aluminium can
"In our program, we try to emphasize that a
driver should always pay attention when crossmg
any 4tracks and realize a tram could be coming We
say, Anytime is tram time
"We also emphasize that only the driver has a
choice. The engineer cannot veer to the right or left
to miss a vehicle and it usually takes a half-mile to
as much as a mile and a half to stop a 10,000-ton
tram
'It is the motorist who has to pay attention to the
railroad signs placed at everv crossmg and to watch
for trains if these kinds of accidents are to be
reduced,' Tincher concluded
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